Universally Truthful Secondary Spectrum Auctions

TL;DR

This paper introduces a universal mechanism design approach for spectrum auctions in wireless networks, enabling truthful, approximation algorithms applicable across various interference models and network scenarios.

Contribution

It presents a simple, versatile technique to convert existing algorithms into truthful mechanisms for diverse wireless network problems, including SINR-based interference models.

Findings

First universally truthful mechanisms with worst-case guarantees

Applicable to single-hop and multi-hop scheduling, routing, and allocation

Works across all known interference models, including SINR

Abstract

We present algorithms for implementing local spectrum redistribution in wireless networks using a mechanism design approach. For example, in single-hop request scheduling, secondary users are modeled as rational agents that have private utility when getting assigned a channel for successful transmission. We present a rather simple algorithmic technique that allows to turn existing and future approximation algorithms and heuristics into truthful mechanisms for a large variety of networking problems. In contrast to previous work, our approach works for virtually all known interference models in the literature, including the physical model of interference based on SINR. It allows to address single-hop and multi-hop scheduling, routing, and even more general assignment and allocation problems. Our mechanisms are randomized and represent the first universally-truthful mechanisms for these problems with rigorous worst-case guarantees on the solution quality. In this way, our mechanisms can be used to obtain guaranteed solution quality even with risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders, for which existing approaches fail.