Selection and Influence in Cultural Dynamics
David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Aleksandrs Slivkins

TL;DR
This paper models the interplay of influence and selection in cultural dynamics, providing a formal analysis of societal outcomes and equilibrium states in a stylized population model.
Contribution
It offers a comprehensive characterization of stable equilibria and convergence in a model combining influence and selection based on type similarity.
Findings
Complete characterization of stable equilibrium outcomes
Proof of convergence from all initial states
Analysis of influence and selection effects on societal diversity
Abstract
One of the fundamental principles driving diversity or homogeneity in domains such as cultural differentiation, political affiliation, and product adoption is the tension between two forces: influence (the tendency of people to become similar to others they interact with) and selection (the tendency to be affected most by the behavior of others who are already similar). Influence tends to promote homogeneity within a society, while selection frequently causes fragmentation. When both forces act simultaneously, it becomes an interesting question to analyze which societal outcomes should be expected. To study this issue more formally, we analyze a natural stylized model built upon active lines of work in political opinion formation, cultural diversity, and language evolution. We assume that the population is partitioned into "types" according to some traits (such as language spoken or…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Media Influence and Politics · Game Theory and Applications
