Epistemological Relevance and Statistical Knowledge

TL;DR

This paper discusses the concept of statistical knowledge in epistemology, highlighting the lack of clarity on what constitutes adequate statistical knowledge and its role in managing epistemic uncertainty.

Contribution

It critically examines the notion of adequate statistical knowledge and its significance in epistemology, addressing gaps in understanding its definition and application.

Findings

Identifies ambiguity in the concept of adequate statistical knowledge

Highlights the need for clearer criteria for statistical knowledge in epistemology

Suggests that understanding statistical knowledge is crucial for managing epistemic uncertainty

Abstract

For many years, at least since McCarthy and Hayes (1969), writers have lamented, and attempted to compensate for, the alleged fact that we often do not have adequate statistical knowledge for governing the uncertainty of belief, for making uncertain inferences, and the like. It is hardly ever spelled out what "adequate statistical knowledge" would be, if we had it, and how adequate statistical knowledge could be used to control and regulate epistemic uncertainty.