Normalization and the Representation of Nonmonotonic Knowledge in the Theory of Evidence

TL;DR

This paper explores the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, introducing a concept of monotonicity and demonstrating how belief structures can represent commonsense knowledge despite the nonmonotonic nature of knowledge accumulation.

Contribution

It introduces a new concept of monotonicity related to belief and plausibility, and shows how belief structures can effectively represent nonmonotonic, commonsense knowledge.

Findings

Knowledge accumulation in Dempster-Shafer theory is nonmonotonic.

Belief structures can represent typical or commonsense knowledge.

A new concept of monotonicity related to belief and plausibility is proposed.

Abstract

We discuss the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We introduce a concept of monotonicity which is related to the diminution of the range between belief and plausibility. We show that the accumulation of knowledge in this framework exhibits a nonmonotonic property. We show how the belief structure can be used to represent typical or commonsense knowledge.