The Transferable Belief Model and Other Interpretations of Dempster-Shafer's Model

TL;DR

This paper reviews various interpretations of Dempster-Shafer's belief model, emphasizing the importance of both static and dynamic components, and introduces the transferable belief model as a purified, non-probabilistic interpretation.

Contribution

It clarifies different models of belief, highlights the significance of dynamic components, and presents the transferable belief model as a distinct interpretation of Shafer's work.

Findings

The dynamic component is crucial for understanding belief models.

The transferable belief model is a purified interpretation of Shafer's work.

Static-only analyses are insufficient for comprehensive understanding.

Abstract

Dempster-Shafer's model aims at quantifying degrees of belief But there are so many interpretations of Dempster-Shafer's theory in the literature that it seems useful to present the various contenders in order to clarify their respective positions. We shall successively consider the classical probability model, the upper and lower probabilities model, Dempster's model, the transferable belief model, the evidentiary value model, the provability or necessity model. None of these models has received the qualification of Dempster-Shafer. In fact the transferable belief model is our interpretation not of Dempster's work but of Shafer's work as presented in his book (Shafer 1976, Smets 1988). It is a ?purified' form of Dempster-Shafer's model in which any connection with probability concept has been deleted. Any model for belief has at least two components: one static that describes our state of belief, the other dynamic that explains how to update our belief given new pieces of information. We insist on the fact that both components must be considered in order to study these models. Too many authors restrict themselves to the static component and conclude that Dempster-Shafer theory is the same as some other theory. But once the dynamic component is considered, these conclusions break down. Any comparison based only on the static component is too restricted. The dynamic component must also be considered as the originality of the models based on belief functions lies in its dynamic component.