Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built, And What We Can Do about It
Bent Flyvbjerg

TL;DR
This paper examines why poorly planned infrastructure projects often succeed on paper but fail in reality, highlighting incentives for misrepresentation, and proposes solutions for more effective and democratic infrastructure development.
Contribution
It uncovers the causes of cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in infrastructure projects, emphasizing the role of incentives and proposing reforms for better project outcomes.
Findings
Projects with the best initial estimates often have the highest overruns
Cost-benefit analysis is unreliable for major infrastructure projects
Incentive structures encourage underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits
Abstract
The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequence is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost-benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
