Quantifying the Impact of Leveraging and Diversification on Systemic Risk

TL;DR

This paper models how leverage and diversification influence systemic risk in financial systems, identifying conditions under which diversification can mitigate or fail to prevent systemic crises, with implications for regulation.

Contribution

It introduces a model linking portfolio overlaps, leverage, and market conditions to systemic risk, highlighting optimal diversification thresholds for risk mitigation.

Findings

Optimal diversification levels depend on market size and volatility.

A safe regime exists where leverage does not increase systemic risk.

In a risky regime, leverage escalation leads to higher systemic risk.

Abstract

Excessive leverage, i.e. the abuse of debt financing, is considered one of the primary factors in the default of financial institutions. Systemic risk results from correlations between individual default probabilities that cannot be considered independent. Based on the structural framework by Merton (1974), we discuss a model in which these correlations arise from overlaps in banks' portfolios. Portfolio diversification is used as a strategy to mitigate losses from investments in risky projects. We calculate an optimal level of diversification that has to be reached for a given level of excessive leverage to still mitigate an increase in systemic risk. In our model, this optimal diversification further depends on the market size and the market conditions (e.g. volatility). It allows to distinguish between a safe regime, in which excessive leverage does not result in an increase of systemic risk, and a risky regime, in which excessive leverage cannot be mitigated leading to an increased systemic risk. Our results are of relevance for financial regulators.