Psi-Epistemic Theories: The Role of Symmetry
Scott Aaronson, Adam Bouland, Lynn Chua, George Lowther

TL;DR
This paper proves that in dimensions three and higher, symmetric psi-epistemic theories cannot reproduce quantum predictions, but without symmetry, such theories can exist, highlighting fundamental limitations and possibilities in quantum foundations.
Contribution
The paper establishes a new no-go theorem for symmetric psi-epistemic theories in dimensions d≥3, extending previous results without relying on Kochen-Specker or PBR assumptions.
Findings
No symmetric psi-epistemic theories in dimensions d≥3 satisfy maximum nontriviality.
Existence of maximally-nontrivial psi-epistemic theories without symmetry in all finite dimensions.
The proof employs measure theory and differential geometry techniques.
Abstract
Formalizing an old desire of Einstein, "psi-epistemic theories" try to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, while viewing quantum states as ordinary probability distributions over underlying objects called "ontic states." Regardless of one's philosophical views about such theories, the question arises of whether one can cleanly rule them out, by proving no-go theorems analogous to the Bell Inequality. In the 1960s, Kochen and Specker (who first studied these theories) constructed an elegant psi-epistemic theory for Hilbert space dimension d=2, but also showed that any deterministic psi-epistemic theory must be "measurement contextual" in dimensions 3 and higher. Last year, the topic attracted renewed attention, when Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) showed that any psi-epistemic theory must "behave badly under tensor product." In this paper, we prove that even without the…
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