Strategic Analysis of Trust Models for User-Centric Networks

TL;DR

This paper analyzes a trust model for user-centric networks combining reputation and virtual currency, using formal verification to identify risks and propose improvements for promoting cooperation.

Contribution

It introduces a formal analysis framework for trust models in user-centric networks and develops strategies to enhance cooperation and mitigate risks.

Findings

Optimal strategies for users and providers identified

Potential risks in the cooperation mechanism exposed

Proposed improvements to strengthen trust and cooperation

Abstract

We present a strategic analysis of a trust model that has recently been proposed for promoting cooperative behaviour in user-centric networks. The mechanism for cooperation is based on a combination of reputation and virtual currency schemes in which service providers reward paying customers and punish non-paying ones by adjusting their reputation, and hence the price they pay for services. We model and analyse this system using PRISM-games, a tool that performs automated verification and strategy synthesis for stochastic multi-player games using the probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards (rPATL). We construct optimal strategies for both service users and providers, which expose potential risks of the cooperation mechanism and which we use to devise improvements that counteract these risks.