Functional Dependence in Strategic Games (extended abstract)
Kristine Harjes (McDaniel College), Pavel Naumov (McDaniel College)
TL;DR
This paper explores how strategies in multi-player Nash equilibria are functionally dependent on each other within fixed dependency graphs, introducing a logical system that characterizes these dependencies and proving its completeness.
Contribution
It introduces a logical framework for analyzing functional dependencies in strategic games with fixed payoff graph structures, establishing its completeness.
Findings
Proposes a logical system for functional dependencies in strategic games.
Proves the completeness of the logical system.
Analyzes properties of dependencies in Nash equilibria.
Abstract
The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency graph for pay-off functions. A logical system describing properties of functional dependence for any given graph is proposed and is proven to be complete.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Research in Systems and Signal Processing · Aquatic and Environmental Studies · Game Theory and Applications