Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Cooperative Transmission in Vehicular Networks

TL;DR

This paper models cooperative transmission in vehicular networks using coalitional game theory, considering vehicle and RSU cooperation, mobility, and pricing mechanisms to improve data relaying.

Contribution

It introduces a novel coalitional game framework with pricing for vehicle-RSU cooperation, accounting for mobility and encounter dynamics.

Findings

Game stability is analyzed and verified.

Numerical results demonstrate effective cooperation strategies.

Pricing incentivizes RSUs to participate in relaying.

Abstract

Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles' data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied. Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and 2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.