On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle
Deborah G. Mayo

TL;DR
This paper critically examines Birnbaum's argument linking the Weak Conditionality Principle and sufficiency to the Strong Likelihood Principle, highlighting cases where the principles do not imply the SLP, thus challenging a common inference justification.
Contribution
The paper offers a new clarification and critique of Birnbaum's argument, demonstrating that WCP and SP do not necessarily imply the SLP, contrary to traditional claims.
Findings
Cases where data violate the SLP despite holding WCP and SP
Refutation of the claim that WCP and SP imply SLP
Clarification of the relationship between principles in statistical inference
Abstract
An essential component of inference based on familiar frequentist notions, such as -values, significance and confidence levels, is the relevant sampling distribution. This feature results in violations of a principle known as the strong likelihood principle (SLP), the focus of this paper. In particular, if outcomes and from experiments and (both with unknown parameter ) have different probability models , then even though for all , outcomes and may have different implications for an inference about . Although such violations stem from considering outcomes other than the one observed, we argue this does not require us to consider experiments other than the one performed to produce the data. David Cox [Ann. Math.…
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