URDP: General Framework for Direct CCA2 Security from any Lattice-Based PKE Scheme
Roohallah Rastaghi

TL;DR
This paper introduces an efficient universal random data padding scheme that enables direct CCA2 security for lattice-based public key encryption, eliminating the need for separate encryption and enhancing practicality for resource-constrained devices.
Contribution
It presents the first universal padding scheme that achieves direct CCA2 security from any lattice-based PKE scheme in the standard model.
Findings
Achieves direct CCA2 security without separate encryption.
Tightly reduces security to one-way trapdoor functions.
Applicable to resource-limited devices like smart cards and RFID tags.
Abstract
Design efficient lattice-based cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is a challenge problem. To the date, full CCA2-security of all proposed lattice-based PKE schemes achieved by using a generic transformations such as either strongly unforgeable one-time signature schemes (SU-OT-SS), or a message authentication code (MAC) and weak form of commitment. The drawback of these schemes is that encryption requires "separate encryption". Therefore, the resulting encryption scheme is not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice and it is inappropriate for many applications such as small ubiquitous computing devices with limited resources such as smart cards, active RFID tags, wireless sensor networks and other embedded devices. In this work, for the first time, we introduce an efficient universal random data padding (URDP) scheme, and show how it can be…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Cryptographic Implementations and Security · Nanocluster Synthesis and Applications
