Limitations of Skeptical Default Reasoning
Jens Doerpmund
TL;DR
This paper critiques the limitations of skeptical default reasoning, demonstrating that both nonmonotonic logics and Pollock's defeasible reasoning fail to address the lottery paradox due to their incompatibility with skeptical derivability.
Contribution
The paper reveals fundamental limitations of skeptical default reasoning and extends the critique to Pollock's defeasible reasoning, highlighting their shared incompatibility with certain paradoxes.
Findings
Nonmonotonic logics fail with the lottery paradox
Pollock's defeasible reasoning also fails for the same reason
Skeptical derivability is incompatible with certain reasoning frameworks
Abstract
Poole has shown that nonmonotonic logics do not handle the lottery paradox correctly. In this paper we will show that Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning fails for the same reason: defeasible reasoning is incompatible with the skeptical notion of derivability.
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Logic, programming, and type systems