Evolutionary games on the lattice: Payoffs affecting birth and death rates
N. Lanchier

TL;DR
This paper explores how local interactions on a lattice influence evolutionary game dynamics, showing that spatial structure reduces coexistence and promotes dominant strategies, contrasting with predictions from well-mixed models.
Contribution
It introduces a lattice-based model for evolutionary games, analyzing how local interactions alter phase diagrams compared to mean-field replicator equations.
Findings
Local interactions reduce the coexistence region.
A dominant strategy emerges even at low densities.
Spatial structure affects classic game outcomes.
Abstract
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a payoff based on her strategy, the strategy of her neighbors and a payoff matrix. Following the traditional approach of evolutionary game theory, this payoff is interpreted as a fitness: the dynamics of the system is derived by thinking of positive payoffs as birth rates and the absolute value of negative payoffs as death rates. The nonspatial mean-field approximation obtained under the assumption that the population is well mixing is the popular replicator equation. The main objective is to understand the consequences of the inclusion of local interactions by investigating and comparing the phase diagrams of the spatial and nonspatial models in the four…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
