General method for the security analysis in a quantum direct communication protocol
Jaros{\l}aw Adam Miszczak, Piotr Zawadzki

TL;DR
This paper presents a versatile and comprehensive method for analyzing the security of quantum direct communication protocols by examining superoperators and incorporating noise models, enhancing the understanding of eavesdropper information gain.
Contribution
A new general approach for security analysis in quantum communication that unifies noise modeling and quantum discrimination theory.
Findings
Allows incorporation of various noise models
Provides a unified framework for security analysis
Improves estimation of eavesdropper's information gain
Abstract
We introduce a general approach for the analysis of a quantum direct communication protocol. The method is based on the investigation of the superoperator acting on a joint system of the communicating parties and the eavesdropper. The introduced method is more versatile than the approaches used so far as it permits to incorporate different noise models in a unified way. Moreover, it make use of a well grounded theory of quantum discrimination for the purpose of estimating the eavesdropper's information gain.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Information and Cryptography · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
