Popular Matchings -- structure and cheating strategies
Meghana Nasre

TL;DR
This paper investigates the structure of popular matchings in bipartite graphs with preferences involving ties and develops algorithms to compute optimal cheating strategies for agents, addressing open questions in the field.
Contribution
It introduces a switching graph characterization for popular matchings with ties and provides efficient algorithms for agents to manipulate outcomes.
Findings
Optimal cheating strategies can be computed efficiently.
Switching graph characterization extends to ties, solving open problems.
Algorithms run in O(√n m) and O(m+n) time for different preference types.
Abstract
We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. The popular matchings problem can be defined as follows: Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges in E are ranked. Each agent ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching M is popular if there exists no matching M' such that the number of agents that prefer M' to M exceeds the number of agents that prefer M to M'. Consider a centralized market where agents submit their preferences and a central authority matches agents to posts according to the notion of popularity. Since a popular matching need not be unique, we assume that the central authority chooses an arbitrary popular matching. Let a1 be the sole manipulative agent who is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents. The goal of a1 is to…
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