The Inverse Shapley Value Problem
Anindya De, Ilias Diakonikolas, Rocco A. Servedio

TL;DR
This paper introduces the first efficient algorithm with provable guarantees for designing weighted voting schemes that approximate a desired vector of Shapley-Shubik indices, addressing a longstanding problem in social choice theory.
Contribution
It provides the first provably correct, efficient algorithm for the inverse Shapley value problem, capable of approximating desired influence distributions in weighted voting schemes.
Findings
Algorithm runs in fixed poly(n) time for any small error 5.
Achieves 5-error in Shapley values for reasonable voting schemes.
Exact polynomial-time solution for schemes with integer weights at most poly(n).
Abstract
For a weighted voting scheme used by voters to choose between two candidates, the \emph{Shapley-Shubik Indices} (or {\em Shapley values}) of provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome of the vote. Shapley-Shubik indices were introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 \cite{SS54} and are widely studied in social choice theory as a measure of the "influence" of voters. The \emph{Inverse Shapley Value Problem} is the problem of designing a weighted voting scheme which (approximately) achieves a desired input vector of values for the Shapley-Shubik indices. Despite much interest in this problem no provably correct and efficient algorithm was known prior to our work. We give the first efficient algorithm with provable performance guarantees for the Inverse Shapley Value Problem. For any constant our algorithm…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
