Compelled to do the right thing
M. F. Laguna, G. Abramson, J. R. Iglesias

TL;DR
This paper models opinion formation to analyze how external enforcement and educated groups influence societal compliance, finding that small interventions can effectively change collective behavior.
Contribution
It introduces a model combining social influence, external enforcement, and educated agents to study societal compliance mechanisms.
Findings
Few monitors can induce societal change.
Small educated groups are effective under random interactions.
Network structure affects the influence of interventions.
Abstract
We use a model of opinion formation to study the consequences of some mechanisms attempting to enforce the right behaviour in a society. We start from a model where the possible choices are not equivalent (such is the case when the agents decide to comply or not with a law) and where an imitation mechanism allow the agents to change their behaviour based on the influence of a group of partners. In addition, we consider the existence of two social constraints: a) an external authority, called monitor, that imposes the correct behaviour with infinite persuasion and b) an educated group of agents that act upon their fellows but never change their own opinion, i.e., they exhibit infinite adamancy. We determine the minimum number of monitors to induce an effective change in the behaviour of the social group, and the size of the educated group that produces the same effect. Also, we compare…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
