Constant-Competitive Prior-Free Auction with Ordered Bidders

TL;DR

This paper introduces a prior-free auction mechanism that guarantees a constant factor of the optimal revenue without prior knowledge of bidders' valuation distributions, improving upon previous logarithmic approximations.

Contribution

The paper presents the first prior-free auction with a constant approximation guarantee for revenue, advancing auction design theory.

Findings

Achieved a constant-approximate revenue guarantee

Improved from previous $O( ext{log}^* n)$ approximation

Demonstrated effectiveness in non-i.i.d. bidder settings

Abstract

A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to find a truthful auction (no bidder can gain in utility by misreporting her valuation) that maximizes the expected revenue. Naturally, the optimal-auction is sensitive to the prior distributions. An intriguing question is to design a truthful auction that is oblivious to these priors, and yet manages to get a constant factor of the optimal revenue. Such auctions are called prior-free. Goldberg et al. presented a constant-approximate prior-free auction when there are identical copies of an item available in unlimited supply, bidders are unit-demand, and their valuations are drawn from i.i.d. distributions. The recent work of Leonardi et al. [STOC 2012] generalized this problem to non i.i.d. bidders, assuming that the auctioneer knows the ordering of their reserve prices. Leonardi et al. proposed a prior-free auction that achieves a $O(\log^* n)$ approximation. We improve upon this result, by giving the first prior-free auction with constant approximation guarantee.