Core stability in hedonic coalition formation

TL;DR

This survey explores core stability in hedonic coalition formation, discussing key concepts, algorithms, examples, and open problems in the context of group-based decision-making across various social and economic domains.

Contribution

It provides a comprehensive overview of core stability in hedonic coalition formation, including algorithmic approaches, examples, and open research questions.

Findings

Overview of core stability concepts

Algorithmic approaches for hedonic coalition stability

Identification of open problems in the field

Abstract

In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation. This survey discusses the notion of core stability in hedonic coalition formation (where each player's happiness only depends on the other members of his coalition but not on how the remaining players outside his coalition are grouped). We present the central concepts and algorithmic approaches in the area, provide many examples, and pose a number of open problems.