Self-Organizing Flows in Social Networks
Nidhi Hegde (LINCS), Laurent Massouli\'e (MSR - INRIA), Laurent, Viennot (INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt,LIAFA,LINCS)

TL;DR
This paper investigates how self-organization in social networks affects the efficiency of social filtering, revealing conditions under which stable and efficient information dissemination emerges or fails due to user interest heterogeneity.
Contribution
It introduces flow games to model network formation with selfish users and analyzes convergence and efficiency under different interest structures.
Findings
Selfish dynamics converge to near-optimal structures with homogeneous interests.
Heterogeneous interests can lead to arbitrarily inefficient information dissemination.
Low doubling dimension interest spaces ensure convergence and complete information access.
Abstract
Social networks offer users new means of accessing information, essentially relying on "social filtering", i.e. propagation and filtering of information by social contacts. The sheer amount of data flowing in these networks, combined with the limited budget of attention of each user, makes it difficult to ensure that social filtering brings relevant content to the interested users. Our motivation in this paper is to measure to what extent self-organization of the social network results in efficient social filtering. To this end we introduce flow games, a simple abstraction that models network formation under selfish user dynamics, featuring user-specific interests and budget of attention. In the context of homogeneous user interests, we show that selfish dynamics converge to a stable network structure (namely a pure Nash equilibrium) with close-to-optimal information dissemination. We…
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