A Secure Control Framework for Resource-Limited Adversaries

TL;DR

This paper introduces a comprehensive framework for analyzing and illustrating cyber attacks on resource-limited networked control systems, including experimental validation on a wireless-controlled quadruple-tank process.

Contribution

It presents a novel attack space model considering adversary resources and demonstrates analysis of various attack scenarios with experimental validation.

Findings

Attack scenarios analyzed using the framework

Impact characterized with safe sets

Experimental validation on quadruple-tank system

Abstract

Cyber-secure networked control is modeled, analyzed, and experimentally illustrated in this paper. An attack space defined by the adversary's system knowledge, disclosure, and disruption resources is introduced. Adversaries constrained by these resources are modeled for a networked control system architecture. It is shown that attack scenarios corresponding to denial-of-service, replay, zero-dynamics, and bias injection attacks can be analyzed using this framework. Furthermore, the attack policy for each scenario is described and the attack's impact is characterized using the concept of safe sets. An experimental setup based on a quadruple-tank process controlled over a wireless network is used to illustrate the attack scenarios, their consequences, and potential counter-measures.