Channel Independent Cryptographic Key Distribution

TL;DR

This paper introduces a method for cryptographic key distribution over a simulated noisy channel created by local noise addition, enabling secure key exchange even when the physical channel isn't inherently noisy.

Contribution

It demonstrates that two parties can simulate a noisy channel through local noise addition, achieving secrecy capacity without relying on an inherently noisy communication channel.

Findings

Simulated noisy channels can achieve positive secrecy capacity.

Key exchange is feasible with local noise addition.

Secrecy conditions are derived and validated through simulations.

Abstract

This paper presents a method of cryptographic key distribution using an `artificially' noisy channel. This is an important development because, while it is known that a noisy channel can be used to generate unconditional secrecy, there are many circumstances in which it is not possible to have a noisy information exchange, such as in error corrected communication stacks. It is shown that two legitimate parties can simulate a noisy channel by adding local noise onto the communication and that the simulated channel has a secrecy capacity even if the underlying channel does not. A derivation of the secrecy conditions is presented along with numerical simulations of the channel function to show that key exchange is feasible.