Distinguishing initial state-vectors from each other in histories formulations and the PBR argument

TL;DR

This paper investigates whether the PBR argument against $$-epistemic interpretations applies to histories formulations of quantum theory, especially the co-event approach, and concludes that such interpretations remain unlikely.

Contribution

It analyzes the applicability of the PBR argument to histories formulations, highlighting the limitations and suggesting the improbability of a statistical interpretation for co-events.

Findings

PBR argument partially applies to histories formulations

Limitations prevent reaching PBR's conclusion in this context

Statistical interpretation remains unlikely for co-events

Abstract

Following the argument of Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (Nature Phys. 8:476, 2012), new interest has been raised on whether one can interpret state-vectors (pure states) in a statistical way ($\psi$-epistemic theories), or if each of them corresponds to a different ontological entity. Each interpretation of quantum theory assumes different ontology and one could ask if the PBR argument carries over. Here we examine this question for histories formulations in general with particular attention to the co-event formulation. State-vectors appear as the initial state that enters into the quantum measure. While the PBR argument goes through up to a point, the failure to meet some of the assumptions they made does not allow one to reach their conclusion. However, the author believes that the "statistical interpretation" is still impossible for co-events even if this is not proven by the PBR argument.