Computing with voting trees
Jennifer Iglesias, Nathaniel Ince, Po-Shen Loh

TL;DR
This paper advances the theory of voting trees by constructing new trees that significantly improve guaranteed out-degree, resist manipulation, and implement modular arithmetic, enhancing understanding of computational possibilities in social choice.
Contribution
It introduces three novel voting tree constructions, notably improving the out-degree guarantee to a9(sqrt{N}) and demonstrating trees that resist manipulation and perform modular arithmetic.
Findings
Improved voting tree guarantees out-degree to a9(sqrt{N})
Constructed a manipulation-resistant voting tree
Developed a voting tree implementing arithmetic modulo three
Abstract
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of candidates. Combinatorially, one may summarize this information with a graph-theoretic tournament on N vertices (one per candidate), placing an edge from U to V if U would beat V in an election between only those two candidates (no ties are permitted). One well-studied procedure for selecting a winner is to specify a complete binary tree whose leaves are labeled by the candidates, and evaluate it by running pairwise elections between the pairs of leaves, sending the winners to successive rounds of pairwise elections which ultimately terminate with a single winner. This structure is called a voting tree. Much research has investigated which functions on…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Advanced Graph Theory Research
