Cryptanalysis of a New Knapsack Type Public-Key Cryptosystem
Roohallah Rastaghi

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that a recently proposed knapsack-based public-key cryptosystem is insecure, as it can be broken using Shamir's attack due to its underlying superincreasing structure.
Contribution
The paper reveals the insecurity of a new knapsack cryptosystem by applying existing attack methods, highlighting vulnerabilities in its design.
Findings
The cryptosystem is vulnerable to Shamir's attack.
Its superincreasing structure compromises security.
The proposed permutation algorithm does not prevent attacks.
Abstract
Recently, Hwang et al. introduced a knapsack type public-key cryptosystem. They proposed a new algorithm called permutation combination algorithm. By exploiting this algorithm, they attempt to increase the density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack. We show that this cryptosystem is not secure, as it based on basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem and because of the superincreasing structure, we can use shamir's attack on the basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack to break this cryptosystem.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCoding theory and cryptography · graph theory and CDMA systems · Cryptographic Implementations and Security
