Cryptanalysis of a Public-key Cryptosystem Using Lattice Basis Reduction Algorithm

TL;DR

This paper presents a new, more efficient lattice-based attack on a specific public-key cryptosystem that uses super-increasing sequences, demonstrating improved practicality over previous cryptanalysis methods.

Contribution

The paper introduces a direct lattice basis reduction attack on Hwang et al.'s cryptosystem, outperforming prior cryptanalysis approaches in efficiency and practicality.

Findings

The attack is more efficient than previous methods.

It demonstrates practical feasibility against the cryptosystem.

Shows the cryptosystem's vulnerability to lattice-based attacks.

Abstract

We proposed a new attack against Hwang et al.'s cryptosystem. This cryptosystem uses a super-increasing sequence as private key and the authors investigate a new algorithm called permutation combination algorithm to enhance density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack. Sattar J. Aboud [Aboud j. Sattar, "An improved knapsack public key cryptography system", International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions, Vol.3 (3), pp.310-319, 2011] used Shamir's attack on the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem to break this cryptosystem. In this paper, we introduce a direct attack against Hwang et al.'s cryptosystem based on Lattice basis reduction algorithms. By computing complexity of propose attack, we show that unlike Aboud's cryptanalysis, our cryptanalysis is more efficient and practicable.