Resilient Source Coding

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new source coding theorem for multi-dimensional signals with unknown component distributions, leveraging side information, with applications in game theory and information constraints.

Contribution

It develops a novel source coding framework for signals with unknown component distributions, linking information theory and game theory applications.

Findings

Provides a source coding theorem for multi-dimensional signals with unknown distributions.

Applies the theorem to analyze strategic games like prisoner's dilemma.

Characterizes utility regions in games with signals.

Abstract

This paper provides a source coding theorem for multi-dimensional information signals when, at a given instant, the distribution associated with one arbitrary component of the signal to be compressed is not known and a side information is available at the destination. This new framework appears to be both of information-theoretical and game-theoretical interest: it provides a new type of constraints to compress an information source; it is useful for designing certain types of mediators in games and characterize utility regions for games with signals. Regarding the latter aspect, we apply the derived source coding theorem to the prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes.