Bad Data Injection Attack and Defense in Electricity Market using Game Theory Study

TL;DR

This paper models cyber attacks on smart grid measurements as a zero-sum game, analyzing how attackers can manipulate electricity prices and how defenders can strategize to mitigate such threats, using game theory and simulations.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework to analyze and optimize attack and defense strategies against data injection in electricity markets.

Findings

Game model effectively predicts attack and defense behaviors.

Simulation results demonstrate strategic advantages of the proposed approach.

Attacks can significantly influence electricity prices under certain conditions.

Abstract

Applications of cyber technologies improve the quality of monitoring and decision making in smart grid. These cyber technologies are vulnerable to malicious attacks, and compromising them can have serious technical and economical problems. This paper specifies the effect of compromising each measurement on the price of electricity, so that the attacker is able to change the prices in the desired direction (increasing or decreasing). Attacking and defending all measurements are impossible for the attacker and defender, respectively. This situation is modeled as a zero sum game between the attacker and defender. The game defines the proportion of times that the attacker and defender like to attack and defend different measurements, respectively. From the simulation results based on the PJM 5 Bus test system, we can show the effectiveness and properties of the studied game.