The AND-OR game: Equilibrium Characterization (Working Paper)
Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan
TL;DR
This paper analyzes the mixed equilibria in a simultaneous first-price auction for multiple items involving an AND-OR game with one single-minded agent and one unit-demand agent, providing a complete characterization.
Contribution
It offers a comprehensive equilibrium characterization for a simple yet insightful AND-OR game in a complete information setting.
Findings
Complete equilibrium characterization achieved
Insights into strategic behavior in AND-OR auction settings
Framework applicable to similar auction models
Abstract
We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for multiple items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to completely characterize the mixed equilibria in this setting, for a simple, yet highly interesting, {\tt AND}-{\tt OR} game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models