A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information
Azhar Iqbal, James M. Chappell, Qiang Li, Charles E.M. Pearce, and, Derek Abbott

TL;DR
This paper explores how quantum correlations from EPR experiments influence Bayesian games with incomplete information, revealing that non-factorizable probabilities can lead to a unique equilibrium.
Contribution
It introduces a quantum probabilistic framework for Bayesian games, demonstrating the impact of quantum correlations on game equilibria.
Findings
Quantum probabilities can be non-factorizable in Bayesian games.
Non-factorizable probabilities lead to a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Quantum effects alter traditional game-theoretic outcomes.
Abstract
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying probability set is obtained from generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We find that this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Mechanics and Applications
