Game Theoretical Modelling for Dynamic Spectrum Access in TV Whitespace
Ligia C. Cremene, D. Dumitrescu, Reka Nagy, Marcel Cremene
TL;DR
This paper models dynamic spectrum access in TV whitespace using three oligopoly game theories, introducing a new equilibrium concept and analyzing autonomous versus regulated scenarios in cognitive radio environments.
Contribution
It reformulates TV whitespace access as oligopoly games, introduces the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium, and applies evolutionary methods for equilibrium detection.
Findings
Nash and Pareto equilibria are relevant for spectrum access.
The joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium offers new insights.
Simulation results inform regulation strategies.
Abstract
In order to assess TV whitespace access scenarios, three oligopoly game models are considered and reformulated in terms of radio access: Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand. Besides revisiting the relevance of Nash and Pareto equilibria, a new equilibrium concept, the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium, is considered. An evolutionary game equilibria detection method is used. The analysis of the simulation results brings relevant insights on the issue of autonomy vs. regulation in emerging cognitive radio environments.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing · Game Theory and Applications · ICT Impact and Policies