On some many-valued abstract logics and their Epsilon-T-style extensions
Steffen Lewitzka

TL;DR
This paper extends Epsilon-T-Logic to many-valued, non-Fregean logics based on Dunn/Belnap, Kleene, and Priest's logics, analyzing their semantics, properties, and proof systems to handle paradoxes like the liar.
Contribution
It introduces many-valued non-Fregean Epsilon-T-Logics, studies their semantic properties, and develops a sequent calculus for these extended logics.
Findings
Proves compactness of the consequence relation for B_4 logic
Provides a representation as minimally generated logics
Establishes a connection to Font's approach
Abstract
Logical systems with classical negation and means for sentential or propositional self-reference involve, in some way, paradoxical statements such as the liar. However, the paradox disappears if one replaces classical by an appropriate non-classical negation such as a paraconsistent one (no paradox arises if the liar is both true and false). We consider a non-Fregean logic which is a revised and extended version (Lewitzka 2012) of Epsilon-T-Logic originally introduced by (Straeter 1992) as a logic with a total truth predicate and propositional quantifiers. Self-reference is achieved by means of equations between formulas which are interpreted over a model-theoretic universe of propositions. Paradoxical statements, such as the liar, can be asserted only by unsatisfiable equations and do not correlate with propositions. In this paper, we generalize Epsilon-T-Logic to a four-valued logic…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Algebra and Logic · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Rough Sets and Fuzzy Logic
