Insider-proof encryption with applications for quantum key distribution
Matthew McKague, Lana Sheridan

TL;DR
This paper introduces insider-proof encryption channels to securely reuse devices with memory in quantum key distribution, addressing key leakage issues in device-independent protocols.
Contribution
It proposes a new insider-proof channel concept that enables secure device reuse in quantum key distribution with bounded leakage to adversaries.
Findings
Addresses key leakage in repeated device-independent quantum key distribution
Introduces insider-proof channels for secure device reuse
Provides a framework to bound information leakage to Eve
Abstract
It has been pointed out that current protocols for device independent quantum key distribution can leak key to the adversary when devices are used repeatedly and that this issue has not been addressed. We introduce the notion of an insider-proof channel. This allows us to propose a means by which devices with memories could be reused from one run of a device independent quantum key distribution protocol to the next while bounding the leakage to Eve, under the assumption that one run of the protocol could be completed securely using devices with memories.
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Taxonomy
TopicsChaos-based Image/Signal Encryption · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
