The Authorship Dilemma: Alphabetical or Contribution?

TL;DR

This paper uses a game theoretic model to compare alphabetical and contribution-based author ordering, revealing their impacts on research quality, collaboration, and free riding.

Contribution

It introduces a game theoretic framework to analyze author ordering conventions and their effects on research dynamics and free riding.

Findings

Alphabetical ordering can enhance research quality.

Contribution-based ordering increases collaboration and publication count.

Free riding can occur under any scheme, worst under contribution-based ordering.

Abstract

Scientific communities have adopted different conventions for ordering authors on publications. Are these choices inconsequential, or do they have significant influence on individual authors, the quality of the projects completed, and research communities at large? What are the trade-offs of using one convention over another? In order to investigate these questions, we formulate a basic two-player game theoretic model, which already illustrates interesting phenomena that can occur in more realistic settings. We find that alphabetical ordering can improve research quality, while contribution-based ordering leads to a denser collaboration network and a greater number of publications. Contrary to the assumption that free riding is a weakness of the alphabetical ordering scheme, this phenomenon can occur under any contribution scheme, and the worst case occurs under contribution-based ordering. Finally, we show how authors working on multiple projects can cooperate to attain optimal research quality and eliminate free riding given either contribution scheme.