Incompleteness and Limit of Quantum Key Distribution Theory
Osamu Hirota

TL;DR
This paper critiques the common interpretation of trace distance in quantum key distribution (QKD) security, clarifies misconceptions, and proposes a different approach to quantum communication security.
Contribution
It exposes the misconception in the security proof of QKD based on trace distance and discusses alternative principles for secure quantum communication.
Findings
Trace distance does not guarantee perfect secrecy in QKD.
Recent upper bound theories are based on flawed reasoning.
A new principle for quantum communication is proposed.
Abstract
It is claimed in the many papers that a trace distance () guarantees the universal composition security in quantum key distribution (QKD). In this introduction paper, at first, it is explicitly explained what is the main misconception in the claim of the unconditional security for QKD theory. In general terms, the cause of the misunderstanding on the security claim is the Lemma in the paper of Renner. It suggests that the generation of the perfect random key is assured by the probability , and its failure probability is . Thus, it concludes that the generated key provides the perfect random key sequence when the protocol suceeds. So the QKD provides perfect secrecy to the one time pad. This is the reason for the composition claim. However, the quantity of the trace distance (or variational distance) is not the probability for such an event. If is not small enough,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Information and Cryptography · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
