Identifying subtree perfectness in decision trees

TL;DR

This paper introduces the concept of subtree perfectness in decision trees, providing a simple criterion to determine when choice functions satisfy this property, which is crucial for consistent and efficient decision analysis.

Contribution

It offers a non-technical criterion for subtree perfectness, analyzing various choice functions and their compatibility with this property, extending understanding beyond expected utility maximization.

Findings

Almost no choice function satisfies subtree perfectness in general.

Expected utility maximization always satisfies subtree perfectness.

Certain choice functions can satisfy subtree perfectness under specific structural restrictions.

Abstract

In decision problems, often, utilities and probabilities are hard to determine. In such cases, one can resort to so-called choice functions. They provide a means to determine which options in a particular set are optimal, and allow incomparability among any number of options. Applying choice functions in sequential decision problems can be highly non-trivial, as the usual properties of maximising expected utility may no longer be satisfied. In this paper, we study one of these properties: we revisit and reinterpret Selten's concept of subgame perfectness in the context of decision trees, leading us to the concept of subtree perfectness, which basically says that the optimal solution of a decision tree should not depend on any larger tree it may be embedded in. In other words, subtree perfectness excludes counterfactual reasoning, and therefore may be desirable from some philosophical points of view. Subtree perfectness is also desirable from a practical point of view, because it admits efficient algorithms for solving decision trees, such as backward induction. The main contribution of this paper is a very simple non-technical criterion for determining whether any given choice function will satisfy subtree perfectness or not. We demonstrate the theorem and illustrate subtree perfectness, or the lack thereof, through numerous examples, for a wide variety of choice functions, where incomparability amongst strategies can be caused by imprecision in either probabilities or utilities. We find that almost no choice function, except for maximising expected utility, satisfies it in general. We also find that choice functions other than maximising expected utility can satisfy it, provided that we restrict either the structure of the tree, or the structure of the choice function.