Local public good provisioning in networks: A Nash implementation mechanism

TL;DR

This paper introduces a decentralized mechanism for resource allocation in local public good networks, ensuring optimality, voluntary participation, and budget balance through Nash implementation.

Contribution

It develops a novel game form that guarantees Nash implementation of optimal allocations in decentralized local public good networks.

Findings

Mechanism achieves Nash implementation of optimal solutions.

All users voluntarily participate in the resource allocation.

The mechanism maintains budget balance at all equilibria.

Abstract

In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We consider networks where each user knows only that part of the network that either affects or is affected by it. Furthermore, each user's utility and action space are its private information, and each user is a self utility maximizer. This network model is motivated by several applications including wireless communications and online advertising. For this network model we formulate a decentralized resource allocation problem and develop a decentralized resource allocation mechanism (game form) that possesses the following properties: (i) All Nash equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism result in allocations that are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized resource allocation problem (Nash implementation). (ii) All users voluntarily participate in the allocation process specified by the mechanism (individual rationality). (iii) The mechanism results in budget balance at all Nash equilibria and off equilibrium.