Spectrum Coordination in Energy Efficient Cognitive Radio Networks
Majed Haddad, Yezekael Hayel, Oussama Habachi

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic approach for spectrum coordination in energy-efficient cognitive radio networks, enabling primary and secondary users to optimize their transmission strategies and achieve spectrum sharing with improved energy efficiency.
Contribution
It models spectrum access as a Stackelberg game, analyzes equilibrium properties, and proposes a learning algorithm for users to reach optimal spectrum coordination.
Findings
Spectrum coordination occurs naturally at equilibrium.
Users with different channel gains may transmit on the same carrier.
The proposed algorithm improves energy efficiency and throughput.
Abstract
Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a challenging problem, particularly since users experience varying spectrum availability over time and location. In this paper, we propose a game theoretical approach that allows cognitive radio pairs, namely the primary user (PU) and the secondary user (SU), to update their transmission powers and frequencies simultaneously. Specifically, we address a Stackelberg game model in which individual users attempt to hierarchically access to the wireless spectrum while maximizing their energy efficiency. A thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium is conducted. In particular, we show that a spectrum coordination naturally occurs when both actors in the system decide sequentially about their powers and their transmitting carriers. As a result, spectrum sensing in such a situation turns out…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
