Basic Network Creation Games with Communication Interests
Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Martina H\"ullmann, Peter Kling and, Alexander Setzer

TL;DR
This paper introduces a generalized network creation game model that accounts for communication interests, analyzing equilibrium structures and costs, and establishing bounds on private costs and the price of anarchy.
Contribution
It extends the basic network creation game to include communication interests, providing new bounds and insights into equilibrium costs and network efficiency.
Findings
Upper bound of O(√n) for private costs in equilibrium
Tight bound of Θ(√n) for private costs in circular interest graphs
Price of anarchy is Θ(n) for general communication networks
Abstract
Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by a set of selfish peers. Each peer has the ability to change the network in a limited way, e.g., by creating or deleting incident links. In doing so, a peer can reduce its individual communication cost. Typically, these costs are modeled by the maximum or average distance in the network. We introduce a generalized version of the basic network creation game (BNCG). In the BNCG (by Alon et al., SPAA 2010), each peer may replace one of its incident links by a link to an arbitrary peer. This is done in a selfish way in order to minimize either the maximum or average distance to all other peers. That is, each peer works towards a network structure that allows himself to communicate efficiently with all other peers. However, participants of large networks are seldom interested in all peers. Rather, they want to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications
