Designing Information Revelation and Intervention with an Application to Flow Control
Luca Canzian, Yuanzhang Xiao, William Zame, Michele Zorzi, Mihaela van, der Schaar

TL;DR
This paper explores how a manager can design systems that incentivize self-interested users to truthfully report information and follow instructions, using intervention strategies to optimize resource sharing in communication networks.
Contribution
It introduces a framework for designing incentive-compatible systems with intervention capabilities to handle non-compliant, self-interested users in resource allocation games.
Findings
Conditions for achieving optimal outcomes with self-interested users
Design of intervention strategies to ensure truthful reporting
Application of framework to flow control management
Abstract
There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is possible, the manager can ask users to report their private information and then, using this information, instruct them on what actions they should take. If the users are compliant, this reduces the manager's optimization problem to a well-studied problem of optimal control. However, if the users are self-interested and not compliant, the problem is much more complicated: when asked to report their private information, the users might lie; upon receiving instructions, the users might disobey. Here we ask whether the manager can design the system to get around both of these difficulties. To do so, the manager must provide for the users the incentives to report truthfully and to follow…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
