The fate of presentism in modern physics

TL;DR

This paper critically examines the resurgence of presentism in philosophy of time, analyzing arguments that invoke modern physics, especially relativity, and concludes that presentism is metaphysically unappealing despite empirical compatibility.

Contribution

It classifies presentist arguments based on their stance towards relativity and evaluates their strength in light of modern physics, highlighting metaphysical issues.

Findings

Presentist arguments are classified into compatibilist and incompatibilist with respect to relativity.

Modern physics provides support for some presentist claims, but not without metaphysical costs.

Presentism remains metaphysically problematic despite compatibility with empirical physics.

Abstract

There has been a recent spate of essays defending presentism, the view in the metaphysics of time according to which all and only present events or entities exist. What is particularly striking about this resurgence is that it takes place on the background of the significant pressure exerted on the position by the relativity of simultaneity asserted in special relativity, and yet in several cases invokes modern physics for support. I classify the presentist arguments into a two by two matrix depending on whether they take a compatibilist or incompatibilist stance with respect to both special relativity in particular and modern physics in general. I then review and evaluate what I take to be some of the most forceful and intriguing presentist arguments turning on modern physics. Although nothing of what I will say eventuates its categorical demise, I hope to show that whatever presentism remains compatible with empirical facts and our best physics is metaphysically repugnant.