Allocation of Divisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences
Leonard J. Schulman, Vijay V. Vazirani
TL;DR
This paper introduces a straightforward, strategy-proof mechanism for allocating divisible goods among agents with lexicographic preferences, ensuring efficiency, envy-freeness, and practicality.
Contribution
It proposes a novel non-pricing allocation mechanism that combines incentive compatibility with Pareto efficiency and envy-freeness for lexicographic preferences.
Findings
Mechanism is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient.
Allocations are envy-free and time-efficient.
Applicable to strategic agents with lexicographic preferences.
Abstract
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.
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