A Shared-Constraint Approach to Multi-leader Multi-follower Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a shared-constraint reformulation for multi-leader multi-follower games, providing new existence results and linking equilibria of the modified game to the original, with applications demonstrated through examples.

Contribution

It proposes a shared-constraint approach that ensures the existence of equilibria in complex hierarchical games and relates these to the original game structure.

Findings

Global minimizers of the potential function are equilibria of the modified game.

Existence of equilibria is established using fixed point theory without potentiality.

Modified game equilibria can be related back to the original game.

Abstract

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria for it has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.