An Improved Two-Party Negotiation Over Continues Issues Method Secure Against Manipulatory Behavior
Luca Barzanti, Marcello Mastroleo

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the limitations of the IDM in two-party negotiations over continuous issues, proving it lacks strategy-proofness and information concealment, and introduces a probabilistic method that is both IC and SP to achieve efficient, manipulation-resistant settlements.
Contribution
It identifies the drawbacks of IDM and proposes a new probabilistic method that ensures efficiency, strategy-proofness, and information concealment in negotiations.
Findings
IDM is not strategy-proof or information concealing
The proposed probabilistic method is both IC and stochastically SP
The new method leads to efficient, manipulation-resistant settlements
Abstract
This contribution focuses on two-party negotiation over continuous issues. We firstly prove two drawbacks of the jointly Improving Direction Method (IDM), namely that IDM is not a Strategy-Proof (SP) nor an Information Concealing (IC) method. Thus we prove that the concurrent lack of these two properties implies the actual non-efficiency of IDM. Finally we propose a probabilistic method which is both IC and stochastically SP thus leading to efficient settlements without being affected by manipulatory behaviors.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
