An Informed Model of Personal Information Release in Social Networking Sites
Anna Squicciarini, Christopher Griffin

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic model to understand how social network users decide to share, withhold, or lie about personal information, considering individual differences and social influences.
Contribution
It presents a novel deception model based on real-world data analysis that captures user behavior in online information sharing within social networks.
Findings
The model explains user decisions on information disclosure and deception.
Analysis shows varied user attitudes significantly impact privacy behaviors.
The approach enhances understanding of privacy risks in social networking.
Abstract
The emergence of online social networks and the growing popularity of digital communication has resulted in an increasingly amount of information about individuals available on the Internet. Social network users are given the freedom to create complex digital identities, and enrich them with truthful or even fake personal information. However, this freedom has led to serious security and privacy incidents, due to the role users' identities play in establishing social and privacy settings. In this paper, we take a step toward a better understanding of online information exposure. Based on the detailed analysis of a sample of real-world data, we develop a deception model for online users. The model uses a game theoretic approach to characterizing a user's willingness to release, withhold or lie about information depending on the behavior of individuals within the user's circle of…
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