Reputation Games for Undirected Graphs
David Avis, Kazuo Iwama, Daichi Paku

TL;DR
This paper explores different models of PageRank-based reputation games on undirected graphs, providing algorithms to verify Nash equilibria and analyzing how link modifications influence node rankings.
Contribution
It introduces three models for PageRank games on undirected graphs and develops algorithms for Nash equilibrium verification in each, along with characterizations of equilibrium properties.
Findings
Polynomial-time algorithms for Nash verification in trees.
Parametric algorithms for general graphs.
Identification of conditions leading to complete subgraphs.
Abstract
J. Hopcroft and D. Sheldon originally introduced network reputation games to investigate the self-interested behavior of web authors who want to maximize their PageRank on a directed web graph by choosing their outlinks in a game theoretic manner. They give best response strategies for each player and characterize properties of web graphs which are Nash equilibria. In this paper we consider three different models for PageRank games on undirected graphs such as certain social networks. In undirected graphs players may delete links at will, but typically cannot add links without the other player's permission. In the deletion-model players are free to delete any of their bidirectional links but may not add links. We study the problem of determining whether the given graph represents a Nash equilibrium or not in this model. We give an time algorithm for a tree, and a parametric…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
