Analysing ZigBee Key Establishment Protocols
Ender Y\"uksel

TL;DR
This paper models and analyzes the ZigBee-2007 key establishment protocol using formal methods, uncovering an unknown flaw and verifying a proposed fix through control flow analysis.
Contribution
It introduces a formal analysis approach for wireless sensor network protocols, identifying and fixing a previously unknown security flaw in ZigBee.
Findings
Discovered an unknown flaw in the ZigBee protocol
Proposed and verified a fix for the identified flaw
Demonstrated effectiveness of formal methods in protocol analysis
Abstract
In this report, we present our approach for protocol analysis together with a real example where we find an important flow in a contemporary wireless sensor network security protocol. We start by modelling protocols using a specific process algebraic formalism called LySa process calculus. We then apply an analysis based on a special program analysis technique called control flow analysis. We apply this technique to the ZigBee-2007 End-to-End Application Key Establishment Protocol and with the help of the analysis discover an unknown flaw. Finally we suggest a fix for the protocol, and verify that the fix works by using the same technique.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Authentication Protocols Security · Formal Methods in Verification · Security and Verification in Computing
