Quick Anomaly Detection by the Newcomb--Benford Law, with Applications to Electoral Processes Data from the USA, Puerto Rico and Venezuela
Luis Pericchi, David Torres

TL;DR
This paper introduces a quick, simple statistical test based on the Newcomb--Benford Law to detect anomalies in electoral vote counts, applicable to various voting systems and tested on multiple elections.
Contribution
It presents a novel generalization of the Newcomb--Benford Law under voting restrictions and demonstrates its effectiveness in electoral anomaly detection.
Findings
NBL2 rejected in Venezuelan referendum for electronic units
Test successfully applied to US, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela elections
Bayes Factors used for law adequacy assessment
Abstract
A simple and quick general test to screen for numerical anomalies is presented. It can be applied, for example, to electoral processes, both electronic and manual. It uses vote counts in officially published voting units, which are typically widely available and institutionally backed. The test examines the frequencies of digits on voting counts and rests on the First (NBL1) and Second Digit Newcomb--Benford Law (NBL2), and in a novel generalization of the law under restrictions of the maximum number of voters per unit (RNBL2). We apply the test to the 2004 USA presidential elections, the Puerto Rico (1996, 2000 and 2004) governor elections, the 2004 Venezuelan presidential recall referendum (RRP) and the previous 2000 Venezuelan Presidential election. The NBL2 is compellingly rejected only in the Venezuelan referendum and only for electronic voting units. Our original suggestion on the…
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